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The paper critically reviews the intentional model of power in organizational 
management from seven different perspectives. It summarizes some of the most 
debated issues within political science over the recent decades in relation to an 
intentional understanding of the concept of power. We claim that these issues are 
also relevant within organizational management and strategy studies, and we 
point, in particular, to two contemporary research areas, in which the intentional 
concept of power seems inadequate to further push the research agenda. 
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 Introduction 
In this paper we will discuss a prevalent, if today rarely acknowledged, belief in 
organizational management. Put in simple terms the belief says that organizational control or, 
more generally, the notion of control itself, results from empowered management. By 
introducing into the academic management research a number of insights developed within 
political science on the problems of understanding the concept of power, we particularly wish 
to address aspects of understanding management power as an intentional, monolithical 
capacity to exert control.  
 
The ability to produce a desired outcome, whether in terms of an external or internal 
organizational function, is itself a function of deliberate management, so the belief goes. 
Hence, any manipulation of an environment will ultimately require a knowing, willful, and 
powerful Subject. We will claim that this belief is also widely held in academic management 
and strategy research, although not explicitly acknowledged. On the contrary, the belief 
seems to be so deeply rooted in the conceptual management thinking that questioning its’ 
foundations can be dismissed as simply nonsensical. We will not claim that the belief should 
– or even could – be abandoned. Obviously, it shapes organizational behavior and as such it 
is an important practical belief. However, the idea that organizational control necessarily 
results from empowered management is a problematic starting point for scientific 
observation. By simply assuming that the managerial function consists of a simple causal 
relationship between the exercise of power and organizational performance, it is turned into a 
reality which for the organization can be made an object of analysis and upon which it can 
act. At the same time it becomes a reality whose status is unquestionable. Accepting this 
assumption will at best make it possible for us as scientific observers to provide alternative 
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conceptualizations and criteria in which the practice of organizational management might 
reorient itself. It will not, however, make it possible for us to observe and conceptualize 
practices of management, which emerge as counter-intuitive to the dominating, naturalized 
discourse. This is precisely what we would like to discuss by asking the following question: 
What does it mean for our understanding of organizational management that management 
control performance is conceptualized in terms of intentional power? 
 
Turning the cognitive structure of this conceptual consensus into an object of investigation, 
we hence wish to draw out some of the implicit notions of management power, demonstrating 
the boundaries, and consequently some of the problems, of conceiving organizational 
management as necessarily or “naturally” related to intentional control and power. We will 
claim that there is a close analogy between the way management power is typically conceived 
within organizational studies and the way Max Weber and, particularly, Robert A. Dahl has 
defined and understood the concept of power: as a simple and personal capacity for 
intentional and instrumental action.  
 
The structure of our general argument goes as follows. First we present some methodological 
considerations directing our discussion, which focus on the distinction between “concept” 
and “construct”; secondly, we re-state some well-known conceptual ties between 
management, control and efficiency; thirdly, we show how the intentional conception of 
power has an action-theoretical foundation in a more general concept of intentional action; 
fourthly, we critically address the intentional model of power from seven different 
perspectives, primarily drawn from insights developed within political science, thereby 
demonstrating how power is a construct rather than a clear-cut concept; finally, we draw the 
analogy between management understood in terms of managing efficiently and the 
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intentional model of power. Even though leaving the criticism of management self-
understanding implicit and open in this paper we point out some possible consequences of 
basing the management self-understanding on an intentional understanding of the 
management process in terms of efficiency.  
 
Studying the construct of management power 
Laying out methodological criteria for the observation of organizational performance is a 
notorious scientific problem. This paper is inspired by a previous study of criteria for 
evaluating organizational effectiveness. Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) suggested approaching 
the notion of effectiveness, not as a clear-cut concept representing directly observable or 
easily measurable phenomena, but as a high-level construct composed of a number of lower-
level concepts. The problem was – and arguably continues to be – that among organization 
theorists there was a general lack of consensus as to which concepts were to be included in 
the construct of effectiveness and what their relationships should be. They claimed that this 
problem in particular was reflected in factor analytic studies of organizational effectiveness. 
In such studies a set of evaluation criteria initially have to be selected, however, they claimed, 
“…the selected criteria usually reflect an unarticulated but fundamental set of underlying 
personal values about the appropriate emphases in the domain of effectiveness. These 
personal values that motivate the choice of particular criteria ultimately underlie the 
resulting effectiveness dimensions “uncovered” by (but actually antecedent to) factor 
analytic studies” (ibid. p. 365). Instead of simply assuming the construct of organizational 
effectiveness as an object of investigation, the focus of Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s analysis was 
on the cognitive structure of the organizational theorists, because this provided a method for 
“making the implicit and abstract notions of multiple theorists and researchers explicit and 
precise” (ibid.). Therefore, rather than adding yet another level of complexity to the existing 
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confusion of how to properly define the construct of organizational effectiveness, their 
analysis demonstrated that academic conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness could 
be placed within a spatial model consisting of the three value dimensions of “control-
flexibility”, “internal-external”, and “means-ends”.  
 
To address the question of this paper we will take a modified version of the Quinn and 
Rohrbach approach. We will take as our point of departure that the notion of management 
power is a construct somewhat similar to the construct of effectiveness in the sense that it is a 
high-level abstraction inferred by multifarious articulations of lower-level concepts. As an 
individual concept power is essentially contested, which is consistent with the general 
consensus in the discipline of political science, of which it is one of the most constitutive 
elements. However, in the field of organizational analysis in general and management and 
strategy research in particular the multifarious, explicit articulations of management power 
seem to draw significantly on a single and specific but implicit conceptualization of power, 
which assumes a causal relationship between intentional action and organizational 
performance. Therefore, in contrast to the construct of effectiveness, where more or less 
idiosyncratic and personal criteria a priori direct the evaluation of organizational 
effectiveness, the construct of management power seems to be informed by a widespread – 
but no less a priori – conceptual consensus as to the implicit criteria for determining and 
evaluating the power of organizational management. By contrasting this consensus with a 
range of different political science approaches to the construct of power, we hence wish to 
present future avenues for the academic debate about power in organizational management. 
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The Marriage of Management and Efficiency 
Management is often conceived as an instrumental practice consisting in finding the most 
efficient means of organizing the organization and the people it consists of. This belief’s 
prevalence of course dates back to the Enlightenment, where knowledge was vested in the 
new invention of the rational individual or “Man,” rather than the metaphysical being of 
God. That power can be understood instrumentally as a means to an end was stated clearly by 
Thomas Hobbes who in 1651 wrote: “The Power of a man, (to take it Universally,) is his 
present means, to obtain some future apparent Good” (Hobbes 1985 p. 150).  
 
We will argue that to managers today the future apparent good always already seems to be 
understood in terms of organizational efficiency, i.e. the relative ability to control the time 
spent, other material and symbolic resources, and the wished for output. It is worth noting 
that the power of management is thus vested in the authority to apply subjective economic 
preferences (in the broadest sense of the term), since the function of management is to make 
authoritative decisions on the (efficient) allocation of scarce organizational resources. 
Whether vested authority is personal, in the individual manager, or collective, in a team of 
managers, is of minor importance in this context. The important point we wish to make here 
is therefore not that the individual managers’ authority can be subjected to a collective, or 
aggregate, management authority (because this would simply displace the problem), but that 
the rationality of management is to make “hard economic” decisions on behalf of an 
organization, and to hold responsibility for them. 
 
In this sense, organizational efficiency is a simple derivative of management, and thus 
becomes a dependent variable from which an organization’s uniqueness can be measured – 
and compared. Conversely, the management function itself is turned into an independent 
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variable, namely that organizational resource which can explain the comparative efficiency, 
success, and identity of the organization. This is due to the fact that although an organization 
can obtain some control of its’ internal and external environment, and hence to a certain 
degree manipulate endogenous and exogenous influences, such control would indeed be 
attributed to the particular management practice of the organization, regardless of whether the 
practice was highly hierarchical or highly heterarchical, successful or unsuccessful. If it were 
not, what, then, would be the meaningful function of having a management? The 
management of an organization thus plays the important symbolic role of representing the 
personalized will to control. It is the particular choice of management form that can explain 
the level – in both positive and negative terms – of control an organization exercises over its’ 
constituting parts as well as its’ environment.  
 
There seems to be nothing new in this observation, at least seen from a stakeholder 
perspective on organizational sociology (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). To Russell Ackoff the 
raison d’être of any organization is exactly its’ stakeholders. 
 
“This involves recognition of the fact that an enterprise or government agency is 
an instrument of the system that contains it and of those it contains. Serving all its 
stakeholders is the only justification for its existence” (Ackoff 1986 p. 11). 
 
Fulfilling stakeholder expectations thus seems to be the implicit rationale for the manager, 
whose interest, in the words of Nitin Nohria and Robert G. Eccles, lies in “…being able to 
use the word to mobilize action to get things done” (1998 p. 290). A manager openly 
admitting not to be in control would not last long. Critics have claimed that managers are just 
taking credit when things are going well, and try to avoid responsibility when not (Jackall 
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1988). As a specific, instrumental, and opportunistic management strategy, this might be true, 
but it does not change the fundamental belief that managers are expected to be in control, and 
this constitutes a conceptual framework managers cannot easily escape. The conceptual 
framework involves evaluating the explicit task of achieving organizational efficiency – 
which in private firms is ultimately measured in terms of profits – from a perspective in 
which good management leads to more efficiency and bad management leads to less 
efficiency. Management is framed within a teleological means-end structure, where the 
means can vary from organization to organization, but where the end is given and the abstract 
formula of goal-attainment is efficiency. In this framework the practice of management is 
conceptualized in voluntaristic terms: the acting subject of management (individually or 
collectively) not only has a will, but is also able to realize this will, and by doing so exerts 
control over its’ environment.  
 
The points made so far show that efficiency constitutes a socially valid justification regarding 
the role of management, the power of managers, and the framework wherein people are 
submitted to management. Our conclusion is that management power is structured in a 
framework where the managers are expected to influence the managed in such a way that 
things get done more efficiently than otherwise. In the next section we will discuss in more 
depth how this understanding of management relies, firstly, on a generally voluntaristic or 
intentional approach to social action, and secondly, on a particular notion of intentional 
power.  
 
Intentional action and Power 
When we, in modern science, explain phenomena in nature, we often use causal explanations. 
If we can deductively assign a single cause or several well-known causes to the observed 
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effect, we consider it causally explained. The alternative explanations we have available are, 
for instance, explaining in terms of genesis, where the origin of something is explained, or by 
giving functional explanations, where some process sustaining feedback-mechanism 
producing unintended but useful effects is located (Elster 1979). However, in terms of 
relevance for the present discussion, we also have the intentional explanation. When we try to 
understand and explain people’s actions we often use intentional explanations, which explain 
the action in the light of the actor’s motives, beliefs, and will. We explain intentionality and 
will by ascribing to others propositional attitudes, which in the light of their perceived 
subjective beliefs could explain why they were motivated to act in a certain way. When we 
explain by ascribing intentions we hence ascribe propositional attitudes like intentions, will, 
desires, moral convictions, shame, and ideas about duties and obligations. In short, we use an 
intentional vocabulary in trying to reconstruct from the standpoint of a third party observer 
what reasons possibly motivated the person acting. The intentional explanation is the implicit 
core of any action-theoretical framework. 
 
According to Donald Davidson intentional action is action, which can be explained in terms 
of beliefs and desires whose propositional contents rationalize the action, because actions 
become rational relative to the beliefs and values the acting person has (Davidson 2001 p. 
99). The reasons attributed in order to explain an observed behavior might not be rational to 
the observer, but need to relate the intention or belief to the behavior as if it were a cause to 
an effect. The behavior of the four-year-old child, who at night ran out of his home and down 
the street, eventually falling asleep in a doorway, may be explained when we realize that he 
was dreaming of escaping monsters. However, this does not imply that we actually need to 
accept the existence of monsters. To have a reason, to act purposively, or with a view to an 
end, is to act intentionally. Rational people are generally thought to be able to justify their 
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actions by giving reasons for their actions (Brandom 1994; Scanlon 1998). To explain human 
behavior is to look for possible reasons by reconstructing from the outside the inner logic or 
reasons motivating the action.  
 
Hence, the intentional model of action is based on an assumption that the acting subject has 
internal reasons to act, and that others may rationally reconstruct these reasons taking the role 
of external interpreters. This leads to an important distinction between action and behavior. 
When internal reasons for acting are lacking we may speak of behavior, whereas when 
behavior is justified by reasons we may speak of action or intentional action. On the topic of 
intentional action Jürgen Habermas says:  
 
“I call behavior intentional if it is governed by norms or oriented to rules. Rules 
or norms do not happen like events, but hold owing to an intersubjectively 
recognized meaning [Bedeutung]. Norms have semantic content: that is a 
meaning [Sinn] that becomes the reason or motive for behavior whenever they are 
obeyed by a subject to whom things are meaningful. In this case we speak of an 
action. The intention of an actor who orients his of her behavior to a rule 
corresponds to the meaning of that rule. Only this normatively guided behavior is 
what we call action. It is only actions we speak of as intentional” (Habermas 2001 
p. 5).  
 
Intentional action may, according to Habermas, take the form either of communicative action, 
strategic action, or instrumental action (Habermas 1984 p. 333). In short, the intentional 
model of action covers all meaningful action, and excludes only irrational actions where no 
meaning or meaningful plan of action can justify the behavior. In this sense, action is 
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sanctioned according to the meaning it invokes in terms of norms and rules. This implies that 
actions, which are meaningful, will place a responsibility on the acting subject. For example, 
robbing a bank by mistake cannot be classified as meaningful, and will either be sanctioned 
with imprisonment (intentional breaking of rules) or by stripping the perpetrator of his 
rationality (insane behavior).  
 
Having introduced the concept of intentional action we can now turn to the discussion of 
power, specifically the problems associated with explaining the exercise of power as a 
function exclusively of intentional action. However, in order to keep a clear argument – 
which by no means is a simple task when addressing the essentially contested issue of power 
– we will take as our point of departure the definitions of power of the German sociologist 
Max Weber and the American political scientist Robert A. Dahl. Perhaps more than anyone 
they have served as reference points in academic discussions of power, because they seem to 
have put into words what is commonly understood as having and exercising power. 
Obviously, the definitions below form parts of wider arguments, the complexities of which 
we will not address here. The point of this paper is not just to critically discuss the power 
definitions of Weber and Dahl per se, but rather how they are indicative of prevailing – and 
in Dahl’s (1957) own words intuitive – notions of power understood as an individual’s 
capacity to intentionally exercise his or her own beliefs and will through other people’s 
action.  
 
Hence, according to Weber 
“Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will, despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests.” (Weber 1978 p. 53) 
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Along the same lines, Dahl’s definition, which will form the basis of discussion in this paper, 
goes as follows; 
 
“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would 
not otherwise do.” (Dahl 1961 p. 202-203). 
 
We will call these conceptions intentional power, because power is bound to a concept of an 
actor having a will and intention to directly control or command the behavior of another 
actor. This is clear in several respects.  
 
Firstly, the definitions of power given by Weber and Dahl are characterized by identifying 
the actual exercise of power, i.e. power as a definite action. This is often referred to as a 
behaviorist conception because it focuses on actual behavior, which is assumed to be overt 
and empirically observable, like the movement of a hand. Secondly, power is intended by 
actor A, and is seen as a direct result of actor A’s action toward actor B. The direction of the 
power exercised is going from A to B. Actor B’s behavior is assumed to be caused by A’s 
behavior in such a way that power is direct as well as directed. The ideal typical way of 
communicating this kind of power, especially relevant in a management context, is by issuing 
orders. It is notably on this point that the definitions have their intuitive appeal, since most 
people consider an order to be the most obvious example of the exercise of power. Thirdly, 
according to the definitions it is an actor – whether individually or collectively – exercising 
the power, which is therefore seen as something defined relative to and conditioned by the 
actor’s will. Power has its’ primary anchoring in the will of actor A, and secondary anchoring 
in possible conflicts of will between actors A and B. The extent to which actors’ wills are 
themselves constituted and hierarchically organized in terms of, e.g., vested authority, 
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competence, or might, is therefore taken for granted. Fourthly, the wills and intentions of A 
and B are implicitly locked in a given and static environment; they are situational. There is no 
history or path-dependency taken into consideration; only specific situations where an action 
is performed can be classified as the exercise of power according to the definition. Finally, it 
is also implicitly assumed that actor A individually has the capacity to sanction and coerce B 
despite possible resistance. 
 
In sum, the general assumption in the definitions is that the issue of intentionality is 
unavoidable when the power of human agents is to be understood and explicitly defined. 
Below, we will critically review the intentional model of power from seven different 
perspectives. It should be noted that the list of perspectives is far from exhaustive, nor, for 
that matter, developed on the basis of a single structuring principle. Rather, it summarizes 
some of the most debated issues within political science over the recent decades in relation to 
an intentional understanding of the concept of power. We will claim that these issues are also 
relevant within organizational management and strategy studies, and in the conclusion we 
will point, in particular, to two contemporary research areas, in which the intentional concept 
of power seems inadequate to further push the research agenda. 
 
Power and Observation 
The concept of power applied by Dahl points to the observable exercise of power. The 
definition presupposes that a manifest conflict of interests between actors A and B can be 
assumed, and that A’s use of power affects B’s behavior. There is a behaviorist premise at the 
foundation of this notion of power, whereby only the palpable use of power (in terms of, e.g., 
physical force or formal competence) becomes visible in the definition’s field of observation.  
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When Dahl set out to empirically test who actually held power in New Haven, he chose to 
analyze decision-making on key issues only, and, furthermore, did not state objective criteria 
for the selection of such “key issues” (Dahl 1961). He held that he was able to identify 
subjective interests in the form of dominant policy preferences made visible by patterns of 
political participation in concrete key issue decision-making. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. 
Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970) fervently criticized this one-dimensional approach, asking whether 
a sound concept of power could be predicated on the assumption that it was totally embodied 
and fully reflected in “concrete decisions”. To this question they answered: 
 
“We think not. Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of 
decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies 
to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices 
that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those 
issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in 
doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any 
issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of 
preferences” (1962 p. 948). 
 
Along these lines, their argument was that prior to a concrete decision becoming an agenda 
issue in the first place, the game of “non-decision” had already been finished. Hence, with 
their concept of “non-decision” they claimed that power also has a “second face” or another 
dimension; namely in the form of agenda setting and the exclusion of specific interests, 
issues, and agenda items from the decision-making arena. The point they wanted to make was 
that simply observing conflicting behavior in formal decision-making contexts is analytically 
inadequate and does not reveal the indirect exercise of power, because the exclusion 
 15
mechanisms working in the process both prior to (agenda-setting) and following 
(implementing) actual decision-making are not observed, although such indirect mechanisms 
can indeed be observed (1963). Adopting a concept of power focusing exclusively on overt, 
intended action, limits the intentional power to controlling actual present behavior. Past and 
future actions and possibilities are not within the scope of control. Thus the focus on actual 
behavior excludes recognizing potential (understood but not enacted) and latent (not yet 
understood possibilities for) action from the scope of power.  
 
Power as a Relational Social Phenomenon 
By excluding potential and latent action, the will-conditioned notion of power becomes 
relative to the individual actors A and B and therefore lacks a deeper understanding of the 
specific relationship between the two actors. It is possible to claim that the relation is always 
already transcendentally constitutive for any actual use of power, since some relationship 
between the actors is a necessary condition for any use of power. Actor B thus often has the 
possibility of breaking the relation and hence also the possibility of the exercise of power. If a 
woman gets beaten up by her husband she can file for divorce; if the boss’s demands are 
unacceptable you can change jobs; and in the last resort we can break all social relations by 
committing suicide. A consistent analysis of the definition of power therefore seems to 
require an already established social relationship between actors A and B: a relation, which – 
in principle – can always be changed by both actors. Hence, there is a problem connected 
with ignoring the social relation between actors as constitutive for the actual exercise of 
power exactly because the definition ascribes power resources exclusively to actor A. By 
closer analysis, a relationship between A and B, conditioned on B’s transcendental consent or 
impotence, is assumed. Bachrach & Baratz analyzed the implicit relational presuppositions 
build into the intentional notion of power, dismissing claims that it was substantive or 
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material. According to their analysis the relational character of power concerned especially 
three factors: (a) there must be a conflict of interests between the actors A and B, (b) a power 
relationship presupposes that B actually complies with A’s wishes, and (c) a power 
relationship can exist only if one of the actors can threaten to invoke sanctions (1970 p. 21).  
 
Summing up so far, the critique on Robert Dahl offered by Bachrach & Baratz – and later 
Steven Lukes (1974) although from a radically different perspective (see below) – suggests 
that power should not only be understood in behaviorist terms as the actual and observable 
exercise of power (the first face), but that it should also be viewed as operational when it is 
not directly observable and recognized, as in the case of non-decisions (the second face). 
With their critique, the notion of power is extended to include also the potential and latent 
exercise of power, directing attention to an underlying epistemological “blind spot” in Dahl’s 
approach; namely that the dualism between mind and body seems to be ignored. 
 
Power & Consciousness 
The epistemological “ignorance” towards the mind-body dualism inherent in the Dahl 
approach to power seems obvious to the extent that power can be seen as (psychologically) 
operative even if actor A has no explicit or stated intention of actually exercising his or her 
vested power. By simply having the position or status of actor A (i.e. holding the capacity to 
dominate), actor B can (re-)act as if A was indeed exercising power. The premise that “A gets 
B to…” is hence reversed since B can motivate his or her actions with reference to the power 
held by A. The fact that B may internalize his or her own expectations to A and thereby take 
over the role of A, will then re-arrange and re-direct the relationship between A and B, 
although this reversal is unobservable and consequently non-existent in the Dahl perspective. 
 17
One might ask; if it is so easy to reverse the direction of power, what – then – is the leverage 
gained from this definition? 
 
The epistemic fallacy – that B is always able to (choose to) conceal his will and thus 
epistemologically lift or re-direct the exercise of power – becomes a real problem in a 
definition of power resting on observable will, as is also pointed out by Barach & Baratz 
(1970 p. 24). They offer the example of a man wanting to commit suicide but without the 
determination to carry it through. The man approaches a military guard, who according to a 
standing order shouts: “Stop, or I’ll shoot!” Observing this situation from the outside, the 
guard will be the one exercising power, but because of the approaching man’s particular 
interest in dying, he walks on, re-directs the relationship, and exercises power in the fact that 
he gets shot. The example makes it clear that power defined as conditioned on will is 
subjective and relative to the actors’ individual and unobservable consciousness 
(intentionality). They use the example primarily to delimit the concept of direct power to 
situations characterized by overt conflict, thus pointing to the problem with a will-
conditioned and subject-centered definition of power; that it becomes relative to the 
individual subject and therefore invalidates itself as a general proposition on power. In spite 
of its’ general formulation, the exercise of direct power becomes dependent on the actors A 
and B. In the final analysis, however, B’s intentionality and will conditions whether power is 
indeed exercised or not.  
 
Naturally, it is possible to dominate people in a purely physical sense, but the mind 
(consciousness) is not readily accessible, and requires complex, indirect, uncertain, and 
intangible instruments in order to be influenced, as, for instance, language, ideology and 
arguments. Especially within political science, the notion that the mind-body dualism has its’ 
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own justification in culture and everyday life is often ignored. As Michel Foucault has shown 
in Discipline and Punish (1995) imprisonment is a modern invention based on the idea that 
while incarceration is an effective tool for physically controlling people, its’ effectiveness 
rests primarily in the way it disciplines people and their minds to act and think according to 
dominating social norms of acceptability/normality. Nelson Mandela fully understood this 
mind-body dualism, when he claimed that he would not leave prison until Apartheid was 
abolished. Hence, Mandela reversed the logic of imprisonment and was “voluntarily” in 
prison since he was offered “freedom” in return for not being politically active. He remained 
in prison and thereby re-directed the power relation, making himself a symbol of something, 
which could not be changed by the use of force. Gandhi also demonstrated an insight into the 
limitations of the intentional notion of power by saying “You cannot use violence against an 
ideology.” By playing on the mind-body dualism, Mandela and Gandhi with their statements 
seemed to corner those in power by redefining the relationship as well as the direction of the 
power. Actor A becomes powerless because actor B disappears from his role as actor B. 
 
The mind-body dualism has as one of its consequences that it becomes a philosophical and 
epistemological problem how to access other people’s minds. Not even psychoanalysis has 
solved this problem, because the mind is ultimately a private and mental sphere only directly 
accessible to the acting subject, if at all. Without the epistemological means to solve the 
problem theoretically, Dahl simply deals with it on the analytical level by inferring by 
analogy from observable rational behavior to unobservable rational belief structure. In 
consequence, when he defines power relative to what is going on in the minds of A and B, he 
defines it relative to something that is not directly accessible. Thereby Dahl contradicts the 
idea of power being actual, overt, and observable. Most notably, the intentionality of B is at 
stake in the definition – in order for it to be meaningful in the first place – but no one could 
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know what B would have done otherwise. B’s alternative actions will never be observable. 
Counterfactually, any observer, including the actors A and B, have to know in advance actor 
B’s intentions and state of mind before being able to draw any conclusions as to whether and 
to what extent power is exercised. This not only presupposes access to B’s intentionality, but 
it also assumes knowledge of how B would have acted if not subjected to power. There is an 
implicit presupposition that one has to know how B would have acted in a world free of any 
domination or exercise of power. The intentional definition of power therefore implicitly (or 
a priori) assumes B’s freedom to act. It presupposes a possible world of non-power, which is 
a condition quite difficult to fulfill empirically. In short, the intentional definition of power 
presupposes an access to both A and B’s minds, intentions, and interests – presuppositions 
that can never be empirically fulfilled and, hence, potentially be falsified.  
 
Power as a Positive Resource 
It is not uncommon to distinguish between two senses of power: that which is exercised 
“over” someone or something, and the power “to” (do) something. The intentional definition 
of power focuses on power “over”. In specific contexts of decision-making, A has power over 
B. Power is thus primarily understood in negative terms: as a capacity to stop or directly 
determine B’s behavior as a consequence of A’s decision. Hence, the Dahl definition – and 
presumably also the Bachrach & Baratz approach – emphasizes how A’s power is exercised 
at the expense of B’s interests. It is, however, possible to understand power also in positive 
terms: as a capacity for collective decision-making and concerted action. The perspective on 
power as an operative resource in the service of the common good – power as a social 
integrator and power as the realization of the collective will-formation – is, if not excluded 
from, then apparently dismissed in the intentional definition of power. The tradition from 
Talcott Parsons via Hannah Arendt to Jürgen Habermas becomes a critique of the intentional 
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concept of power, because here power is seen as a positive resource and a legitimate capacity 
to apply political consensus to realize the collective will (Hindess 1996 p. 11). Again, it is the 
intentional premise, which excludes the possibility of conceptualizing power as a 
communicative power operative in the service of a collective or a democracy (Habermas 
1996). In this tradition power is not personal but collective and democratic per se. 
 
Non-intentional Constitutions of Power 
By defining power as relative to (i.e. dependent on) the actors’ wills and intentions, Weber 
and Dahl’s concepts become systematically blind to the variety of other epistemological 
levels but for the monological perspective of the individual actor. There are, however, 
concepts of power in which it is located differently: as legality in law; as convention and 
tradition in culture; as authority and role positions in institutions; as competence in 
organizations; and as meaning, rationality, knowledge, and the good argument in discourse 
and communication. By identifying and localizing power as in these – certainly not 
exhaustive – examples, the concept of power is freed from the monological subject centering 
assumed by Weber and Dahl. If power is localized in legal, cultural, institutional, 
organizational, and discursive structures, processes, and products – existing and operating 
relatively independently from the individual actor’s intentionality and personal will – the 
plausibility of these alternative notions of power effectively constitute a critique of the 
somewhat reductionist and narrow scope of the intentional concepts of power.  
 
What is lost, then, is how the formation of ideals, values, norms, traditions, habits, and 
internalized social expectations powerfully affect the individual’s will and behavior. The 
constructive possibility of – through communication – mutually affecting structures of 
expectation and interests, e.g., by way of a formation of norms, is ignored in the intentional 
 21
model of power. The definition is blind to the aspect of power in processes of socialization, 
and the “pressures of adaptation” to tradition and culture, which is often a social condition, 
also constitutive of the prior relation between A and B. For example, the management power 
inherent in value based management and other “soft” forms of management technology 
cannot be disclosed if the observation of power is limited to the focus provided by the Dahl 
definition.  
 
In his book “Power – A Radical View” (1974) Steven Lukes already pointed out the fact that 
Dahl is blind to such latent processes of socialization. Lukes took the Bachrach & Baratz 
critique one – at that time radical! – step further by introducing the distinction between 
perceived and real interests into the theoretical struggle on how to define power. While 
Bachrach & Baratz effectively showed how the first, direct face of power offered by Dahl 
should be complimented with a second, indirect face, they still shared common grounds in the 
fact that both, according to Lukes, were set in the then on-going pluralist and positivist 
theoretical debate on decision-making focusing on observable actors, events, and objects of 
conflict. Consequently, both viewed manifest conflicts – either as with Dahl in concrete 
decision-making, or as with Bachrach & Baratz in the exclusion of conflictual agenda issues 
from the decision-making arena by mechanisms of non-decision – as the crucial element in 
identifying the exercise of power. For Lukes this was highly problematic: 
 
“The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists 
suppose that because power as they conceptualize it, only shows up in cases of 
actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to 
ignore the crucial point, that the most effective and insidious use of power is to 
prevent conflicts from arising in the first place.” (1974 p. 23) 
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The main point Lukes wanted to make was to direct attention to the fact that somebody 
manages to get their interests fulfilled without manifest conflicts in spite of the existence of a 
latent conflict of interests. Hence, the exercise of power can take place through a “mental 
filter” between real and perceived interests: A exercises power over B by influencing B’s 
perception of his interests in a way which is consistent with A’s interests. In this way A 
effectively blocks B’s ability to perceive his own real interests.  
 
“To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do 
what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, 
shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of 
power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, 
to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?” (1974 p. 
23) 
 
Importantly for the Lukes analysis, power is not just exercised by – and towards – individual 
actors, but is inscribed in the very process of socialization, hence, essentially being part of the 
societal fabric. Social institutions will exercise power in the form of, for example, authority, 
when individuals and groups accept certain conditions that are not favorable for them. Along 
similar lines, the absence of dissatisfaction does not necessarily entail a satisfaction with the 
current state of affairs. Such an “implied satisfaction” could simply be explained as an 
inability to realize alternatives; the condition is perceived as “natural” or “unchangeable”.  
 
In this way, Lukes added a new (third) dimension to the discussion of power by introducing a 
distinction between manifest conflicts between individual actors and latent conflicts in the 
very fabric or structure of society, thus providing what we would call a non-intentional 
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constitution of power. His notion of power rested on the epistemic premise that objective 
interest, and thus conflicts between objective interests, lies at the foundation of every society, 
although such conflicts through processes of socialization will not necessarily surface as 
manifest conflicts. Lukes nevertheless imagined that actors could somehow realize their 
objective, real interests through processes of democratic participation and thus “emancipate” 
themselves from their perceived, subjective interests, but he failed to specify exactly how 
such an analysis should be conducted in practice, because it would require that actor B, either 
as an individual or a collective actor, found a “social vacuum” where he was free from A’s 
influence on and (with-)in himself (Bradshaw 1976 p. 121). For the same reason, he was 
criticized for suggesting a classical Marxist concept of objective interests understood as the 
elimination of “false consciousness”. Notwithstanding, he contributed in bringing the 
discussion on power to the question of how to establish a conceptual platform from which it 
is possible to reconstruct a perspective on the world, which is in itself freed from any 
external, individual, and non-intentional form of power.  
 
The Dispositional Character of Power 
It follows from the previous section that understanding power exclusively as an individual, 
personal resource makes one oblivious to the wide variety of ways in which power can in fact 
be exercised through social structure embeddedness (Granovetter 1985). This, however, does 
not mean that manifestations of power cannot be disclosed on the interpersonal level, but it 
does mean that such manifestations will always contain indications concerning the form, 
content, and distribution of power vested in an inter-personal relationship by latent or 
“naturalized” social norms. The lessons learned from the debate involving Talcott Parsons, 
Steven Lukes, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and others clearly show that specific 
conflicts of interest (and their resolution by the exercise of power) will always be bound to a 
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social context and ultimately reflect (an essentially political) struggle over the constitution of 
social or societal relations. In principle, therefore, any interpersonal relationship can be 
socially vested with power in the Dahl sense as one individual’s capacity to decide at the 
expense of another. But this is certainly not the same as claiming that such vested powers will 
always be exercised, or – for that matter – will be exercised successfully. And it is not the 
same as claiming that every interpersonal relationship vested with power will be so strictly in 
the Dahl sense. The point we wish to make here is that perhaps power should be addressed as 
dispositional in a double sense. Firstly, on the societal or collective level, power can be 
understood as a disposition in terms of a fundamental capacity to constitute social relations 
(i.e. power “to”). Secondly, on the interpersonal level, power can be understood as a 
disposition in terms of a capacity for domination in relationships between individuals (i.e. 
power “over”). Since we are here especially interested in the intentional notion of power, it 
would be fruitful to develop this latter point a little further. 
 
A classic theoretical insight across political philosophy, psychology, and sociology is that 
individuals have a fundamental disposition to act either in accordance with, or in opposition 
to, expectations. Within sociology this fundamental disposition has been specified in a 
theoretical distinction between “role-identity” and “role-distance” (Turner 1998 pp. 383-391), 
and the task has been to answer why and how individuals will normally (or rarely) do what 
they are expected to do. In terms of the intentional notion of power this question deals with 
the point that actor A will always have a choice of deciding whether to exercise power or not. 
The actual exercise of power is therefore modally contingent for actor A. Not only B’s 
interpretation will determine if the exercise of power is to be understood in terms of a 
potentiality, but also A’s choice. Exactly because the potential to exercise power exists both 
in terms of A’s choice and B’s understanding and interpretation of the situation, power could 
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be understood as dispositional. A potential or latent capacity is impossible to observe because 
it is not necessarily realized as an actual, overt exercise of power. The dispositional capacity 
is only visible to observation in terms of its manifestations (Morriss 1987 p. 16). This 
constitutes a collapse of the behaviorist assumption of Dahl that power is necessarily actual, 
overt, and observable. Accordingly, power understood as a dispositional concept cannot be an 
instrument, a resource or an actual event, but can only be understood as a potential or 
capacity (Morriss 1987 p. 19).  
 
By consequence, the identification of the exercise of power by a third party observer relying 
on the intentional definition of power is just as problematic as ascribing intentionality to the 
acting subjects. The third party observer runs directly into the fundamental epistemological 
problem that we do not have direct access either to the future, or to other people’s minds. The 
subject’s own reasons for acting could always be different from the ones ascribed by a third 
party. It is a reconstruction created externally to the subject, and therefore not more valid than 
the reconstruction itself. Both rationality and power are properties that in the final analysis 
are externally ascribed in accordance with their (theoretical) determination, and are therefore 
relative to the interpreter’s attribution.  
 
Taking an inside perspective, therefore, does not change the fact that power is dispositional. 
When A chooses whether to exercise power or not it becomes dispositional. When B 
anticipates A’s exercise of power and acts as if A had already exercised power it is 
dispositional. When B makes a cost-benefit analysis and judges that the benefit of complying 




There are phenomena one can choose to observe and analyze as if they were a manifestation 
of power, but which nevertheless, especially within the intentional notion, are not commonly 
(and, again in Dahl’s own words, intuitively) understood as such. The intentional model of 
power seems to cover all possible intentional action; it is all-pervasive and universal, and 
therefore fails not only in discriminating power from non-power, but also in specifying its 
own criteria for relevance. This can be illustrated by substituting the general preposition “to 
do something” in Robert Dahl’s definition with a specific statement. If we hence were to 
compare Dahl’s classic will-conditioned definition with the paraphrase “A gets B to love 
someone, which B would not otherwise love”, it becomes clear that a relevant application of 
the intentional definition of power requires a substantial concretization of the object of 
analysis as well as a specification of the criteria by which intentionality – as opposed to other 
forms of explanatory, descriptive, or interpretive approaches – necessarily leads to an 
adequate understanding of power-relations in the object under investigation. That actor A can 
make actor B love actor C is perhaps not entirely impossible, but nor is it necessarily so. 
Whether a love relationship is constituted as a result of the intentional exercise of power (i.e., 
the explanation) depends entirely on the very question asked (i.e., the object of analysis). To 
ask, “Who made you love that person?” could very well be a relevant question in a context 
justifying an explanation with the exercise of intentional power, but it could also be highly 
irrelevant without abandoning the exercise of power as an explanation. For example, asking 
the question, “What made you love that person?” opens for a wide variety of alternative 
explanations.  
 
What would happen to the meaning of the intentional definition of power if we presupposed a 
knowledge society in which actor A was more knowledgeable than B, and B was in need of 
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A’s knowledge? Would A exercise power when making B do something he would otherwise 
not have done (in this case increasing his knowledge)? What if B was so ignorant that he 
could not understand a simple order given by A? Would actor B’s ignorance and inability to 
be directed by commands reverse the direction of power? And conversely – as pointed out by 
Lukes (1974 p. 51) – is power indeed exercised if actor A cannot be expected to have any 
knowledge about the effects on actor B? If A’s knowledge about the consequences of the 
exercise of power on B is simply not available?  
 
Finally, there are historically rooted trends running from the use of coercion to more refined 
or sophisticated ways of exercising legitimate power. The development from Machiavelli to 
modern management, where semantics of love, trust, friendship, team-spirit, ethics, and 
morality prevail as means to control the autonomous employee, can be seen as a reaction to 
the need for legitimacy in management and decision-making. Capitalism in a democratic state 
is submitted to a demand for legality and legitimacy. The demand for legitimacy in 
relationships of power brings forth the conflict or contradiction that the direction of power by 
the intentional definition goes from A to B, whereas the direction of legitimacy goes from B 
to A. A makes the decisions. B decides whether the decisions are legitimate. When an 
exercise of power depends on it being legitimate, the premise that power analytically depends 
on actor A’s intentions is clearly inadequate. This is a reason why coercion power does not fit 
a state of law and complex modern society. 
 
In sum, the intentional model of power is, at the same time, too narrow, because of all the 
types of power it excludes, and too vague, because it potentially includes all forms of action 
defined as a form of power. That the intentional model of power is not a valid and exhaustive 
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(formal) definition of power is hence demonstrated by the fact that substitution cannot freely 
take place without changing the meaning of the concepts applied in the definition. 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion to this analysis is that the intentional definition of power either defines every 
action as an exercise of power, or defines phenomena, which are not readily an exercise of 
power as power, and thereby fails the task of defining power by discriminating it from what it 
is not. Furthermore, our analysis shows how many implicit assumptions the intentional 
definition of power relies on.  
 
The reason why the very definition of power is important is because it makes a difference in 
how we understand the management of collectives and the role of power in democracies. A 
considerable part of the debate among political scientists has focused on simply defining “the 
essentially contested” concept of power, primarily for two reasons. First, by defining 
concepts we draw theoretical distinctions; for example between what rightfully can and 
cannot be described, classified, and accepted as an exercise of power. The very act of giving 
(theoretical) definitions (e.g., of power) thus already constitutes the exercise of a second-
order “definition-power” (Bordum 1998 p. 217), not to be confused with the first-order 
“defining power” originally suggested by Steven Lukes (1974). In the latter, the concept of 
power is related to its’ exercise by the tacit “coding” of its victims’ interests without them 
being consciously aware of the consent produced in the face of an “objective” conflict of 
interests. In the former, the concept of power is related to the semantic and discursive 
struggle to provide meaningful categories and classifications to first-order concepts of power. 
The first-order definition of any binary conceptual distinctions classifying the world in two 
(e.g., power and non-power) is therefore always also a second-order exclusion of the third, 
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i.e., alternative distinctions. The excluded third being the implicit pre-condition for the 
differentiated two. For example, feminists and post-Foucaultians have consciously addressed 
the issue of how gender bias, for example sexual harassment, would not be defined as the 
exercise of power within the scope of the classic male understanding of power. Only through 
a semantic struggle on how to define power in the first place, have feminists succeeded in 
including sexual harassment as an exercise of power and, hence, as an abuse of power. Thus 
the notion of power is circular in a pragmatic understanding. The conception of power affects 
what counts as power, and the exercise of second-order power may affect the notion of 
power. Our critical analysis of the intentional model of power showed that it does not succeed 
in defining power, or in delineating or discriminating power from non-power. 
 
Political scientists widely agree that democracy deals with establishing legitimate 
institutional procedures, which neither randomly nor systematically privilege one group’s 
aspirations over another. However, the consensus stops when determining how far democracy 
and democratic procedures can and should be extended. Although the general consensus 
stipulates that democracy would formally involve the authoritative allocation of values for a 
society (Easton 1956) – often understood as the right to take collectively binding decisions – 
controversy arises on how appropriate democratic institutions and processes should be 
designed, and hence, about the legal and legitimate extend of democracy. To the extent that 
democracy is defined as a set of institutional procedures, which provide for a legitimate 
distribution of the formalized political power, the definition of power becomes crucial to the 
content and quality of such a democracy. What is really at stake in the second-order discourse 
on how to define power, is therefore a conflict concerning the constitution of the democratic 
institutions of society (Haugaard 1997 p. 139). The relationship between democracy and 
power is circular, because the two concepts are mutually constitutive. Consequently, the 
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debates about, or rather struggles for, definitions are not altogether trivial or practically 
unimportant.  
 
The case of power should be clear by now, but what about organizational management? Is the 
conception of management and power also mutually constitutive? Following our discussion 
above, the answer to this question would be affirmative. If management is conceptualized 
strictly in terms of controlling efficiency within a teleological, intentional frame of 
understanding, then we may see analogue consequences within management.  
 
What we have shown is that the intentional notion of power is conditioned on the model of 
intentional action and hence shares presuppositions with prevailing management conception 
that the ultimate management rationale is intentionally controlling efficiency. It is almost 
impossible within a management context to escape the demand for efficiency, when 
justifying managerial behavior. The demand for efficiency necessarily, so it would seem, 
frame managers in a role where they have to exercise intentional power in order to manage 
the managed more efficiently.  
 
So, what is really the problem at stake here? Is it not perfectly rational that managerial 
behavior should be oriented on one hand by some sort of superior Will and on the other 
towards controlling, in whatever form, the behavior of others? Is the managerial function not 
in itself a perfectly legitimate expression of power? Going back to the introduction, we would 
like to stress that the notion of intentional management, while an important practical belief, is 
a problematic starting point for diagnosing contemporary problems of organizational 
management from an academic perspective, because it ignores some of the paradoxical “blind 
spots” of the traditional research agenda. Notably, there seems to be a paradox in the way 
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management is conceived on one hand as holding the ultimate responsibility for producing 
desired outcomes, but on the other hand as fundamentally deprived of the ability to do so. 
Managers are placed with the responsibility of performing, and failing to perform adequately 
will ultimately result in a change of management. At the same time, however, the means with 
which managers are both expected and equipped to perform will in themselves not guarantee 
that a desired outcome is produced. This leads to a fundamental asymmetry in the way 
managerial responsibility is related to managerial efficiency. Of course, rather than a fixed 
dichotomy, this asymmetry in effect turns the performance of the management function into a 
conceptual continuum, differentiating between degrees of good and bad management. To a 
large extent the academic management and strategy research is concerned with addressing 
this continuum by discussing criteria for determining appropriate and adequate management 
practices (e.g., new management technologies, necessary management qualifications, and 
new forms of management responsibility). But it is not concerned with addressing the 
question of the very appropriateness and adequacy of discussing management practices in 
terms of this particular continuum. 
 
In our view, this “traditional” agenda is not well suited for diagnosing management problems 
in the new knowledge economy. Failing to acknowledge that, today, managers are deprived 
of the intentional power to produce an organizational efficiency, for which they hold 
individual or collective responsibility, will at best only help in reproducing the belief that 
organizational control can exhaustively be understood in terms of a continuum between good 
and bad management. It will not, however, make it possible to develop new notions on how 




Below we give two examples from current research areas, where problems with identifying 
management as the exercise of intentional power become obvious in the context of a 
knowledge economy. 
 
The first example deals with the issue of knowledge production and innovation. According to 
canonical management literature there are basically two ways of creating value in a firm. One 
is to rationalize what is already going on and thereby increase efficiency by exploitation, and 
the other is to expand activities and thereby create innovation by exploration (March 1991). 
Whether the path of rationalization or innovation is chosen, is commonly understood as a 
managerial task. The choice itself will ultimately rest in the managers’ ability and vested 
power to say “yes” or “no” and thus to decide and control the activity. The ones being 
managed seem to be absent from the picture, and left powerless regarding this question. At 
the same time focusing on efficiency alone leaves out the possibility of exploration and 
innovation. The early phases in the innovation process cannot be managed instrumentally. In 
the early phases of the innovation process there is no product to optimize or rationalize, there 
is only a failing market, a need, or a problem to be solved. Our rhetorical question is now: 
can management power, if understood according to the intentional model of power, logically 
support a decision for innovation? Can this decision itself be managed efficiently? The 
inherent instrumentality in the intentional model of power and efficient management seems to 
contradict the possibility. Any management with efficiency as self-understanding, and relying 
on an intentional conception of management power, is very likely to exclude managing 
according to the logic of innovation and exploration. The exclusion of innovation as a 
strategy is justified on the basis of systematic reasons, which from our point of view are not 
rational. Just as the intentional model of power focuses on power “over” and excludes power 
“to”, management power in this sense systematically blocks innovation.  
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The second example relates to the production and consumption of management knowledge in 
the context of consultancy. Today, we see an emerging institutional field in which private 
companies and other organizations make decisions to delegate management functions (e.g., 
on organizational change) to specialized service suppliers, whereby the companies and 
organizations create a distance to themselves. This not only implies that their reflection and 
knowledge of themselves is effectively negotiated in a market (in a contractually based 
interaction with the management consulting enterprise/agent), but also that the power to 
define the organizational unity and identity is dispersed. For instance, when contracts on 
projects of organizational change are negotiated between public organizations and private 
consultancies, power is dispersed from the public to the private sector in the sense that the 
private consultancy firm participates in formulating (future) images of public organization 
and management, which will (or can be expected to, or indeed are intended to) effect how, 
and by which processes, public organizations perform their functions. However, the 
interaction between the public organizations (as clients) and private consultancy firms (as 
suppliers) is regulated by market contracts and not by the exercise of public authority. Hence, 
the delegation or dispersion of power effectively takes on a character of de-authorization. 
This, then, raises important issues of, for example, democratic accountability. Here our 
rhetorical question would be: to what extent is the intentional model of management power 
able to grasp the consequences in terms of efficiency of delegating vital management 
functions to third-party service providers? If management in this fashion can be effectively 
turned into a commodity, how can it meaningfully hold responsibility for its’ performance? If 
public organizations are institutions working within a democratic framework and structure, 
how is it then possible to promote efficiency and to exercise intentional power as a consultant 
working within a framework and structure mainly determined by mechanisms of the market-
economy?   
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In the light of our analysis, these interchanges between public authorities and private firms 
seem to contradict the underlying premises built into the concept of intentional power. Our 
two examples demonstrate that the conception of intentional power in organizations fails to 
produce efficiency in the case where management is trying to use force to create new 
knowledge in the early phases of managing innovation. Neither does it fit the conceptions of 
power in a democratic framework. Many other examples may support the general idea in this 
paper, that relying on a conception of efficiency, tied to an intentional model of action and an 
intentional conception of power in the organization, may not grasp the whole truth about 
efficiency. This, because of the blind spots and conceptual problems inherent in the 
intentional conception of power pointed out in political theory and reanalyzed in this paper.  
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